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Abstract
Many models of market dynamics make use of the idea of conservative wealth
exchanges among economic agents. A few years ago an exchange model using
extremal dynamics was developed and a very interesting result was obtained:
a self-generated minimum wealth or poverty line. On the other hand, the
wealth distribution exhibited an exponential shape as a function of the square
of the wealth. These results have been obtained both considering exchanges
between nearest neighbors or in a mean field scheme. In the present paper we
study the effect of distributing the agents on a complex network. We have
considered archetypical complex networks: Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random networks
and scale-free networks. The presence of a poverty line with finite wealth
is preserved but spatial correlations are important, particularly between the
degree of the node and the wealth. We present a detailed study of the
correlations, as well as the changes in the Gini coefficient, that measures the
inequality, as a function of the type and average degree of the considered
networks.
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1. Introduction
An empirical study focusing the income distribution of workers, compa-
nies and countries was first presented more than a century ago by Italian
economist Vilfredo Pareto. He observed, in his book “Cours d’Economie
Politique” [1], that the distribution of income does not follow a Gaussian
distribution but a power law. That means that the asymptotic behavior
of the distribution function follows a power function that decreases, for big
values of the wealth, as w−α, being α > 1 the exponent of the power law.
Non-gaussian distributions are denominated Le´vy distributions [2], thus this
power law distribution is nowadays known as Pareto-Le´vy Distribution. The
exponent α is named Pareto index. The value of this exponent changes with
geography and time, but typical values are close to 3/2. The bigger the value
of the Pareto exponent the higher the inequality in a society.
More recent wealth distribution statistics indicate that, even though Pareto
distribution provides a good fit in the high income range, it does not agree
with the observed data over the middle and low income ranges. For instance,
data from Japan [3], Italy [4], India [5], the United States of America and the
United Kingdom [6, 7, 8] are fitted by a log-normal or Gaussian distribution
with the maximum located at the middle income region plus a power law for
the high income strata.
Power laws are not exceptions in nature [9], so it is not surprising that the
wealth distribution follows a power law. The quiz with the income and wealth
distribution is not the power law, but how this distribution is generated
through the dynamics of the agents interacting. On the other hand, a Pareto-
Le´vy distribution is more unequal than a Gaussian: when the distribution
follows a power law there are more affluent agents than in the case of a
Gaussian distribution, but also more impoverished agents.
In order to try to describe the processes that generate a given profile for
the wealth distribution diverse exchange models have been widely applied
to describe wealth and/or income distributions in social systems. Different
mathematical models of capital exchange among economic agents have been
proposed trying to explain these empirical data (for a review see ref. [10]).
Most of these models consider an ensemble of interacting economic agents
that exchange a fixed or random amount of a quantity called “wealth”. This
wealth represents the agents welfare. The exact choice of this quantity is not
straightforward, but one can think that it stands for the exchange of a given
amount of money against some service or commodity. Within these mod-
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els the amount of exchanged wealth when two agents interact corresponds
to some economic “energy” that may be randomly exchanged. If this ex-
changed amount corresponds to a random fraction of one of the interacting
agents wealth, the resulting wealth distribution is, unsurprisingly, a Gibbs
exponential distribution [6] that fits the wealth distribution for the low and
middle income range.
Aiming at obtaining distributions with power law tails, several methods
have been proposed. Numerical procedures [10, 14, 15, 16, 13, 18], as well as
some analytical calculations [19, 20], indicate that one frequent result of that
kind of models is condensation, i.e. concentration of all available wealth in
just one or a few agents [21]. This result corresponds to a kind of equipartition
of poverty: all agents (except for a set of zero measure) possess zero wealth
while few ones concentrate all the resources. In any case, an almost ordered
state is obtained, and this is a state of equilibrium, since agents with zero
wealth cannot participate in further exchanges. The Gini coefficient [30] of
this state is equal to 1, indicating perfect inequality [10, 20, 21]. Several
methods have been proposed to avoid this situation, for instance, exchange
rules where the poorer are favored [5, 10, 18, 20, 22] but in all circumstances
the final state is one with high inequality, i.e. very near condensation.
A few years ago one of us presented an alternative model for wealth distri-
bution, the Conservative Exchange Market Model (CEMM), inspired by the
ideas of John Rawls [24] and Amartya Sen [25] and also by the Bak-Sneppen
model for extinction of species [26]. The main point of the model is that
some kind of action should be taken to change the state of the poorest agent
in the society. The idea of a society that takes measures in order to improve
the situation of the most impoverished is compatible with the propositions
of John Rawls, in his book “A Theory of Justice” [24], directed towards an
inventive way of securing equity of opportunities as one of the basic princi-
ples of justice. He asserts that no redistribution of resources within a state
can occur unless it benefits the least well-off: and this should be the only way
to prevent the stronger (or richer) from overpowering the weaker (or poorer).
The practical way to carry out this proposition in a simulation was adapted
from the Bak-Sneppen model for extinction of biological species [26]. In this
model the less fitted species disappears and is replaced by a new one with
different fitness, then, the appearance of this new species affects the environ-
ment changing the fitness of the neighboring species. In 2003 a similar model
was developed where the role of the fitness is substituted by the assets of a
particular agent, and the model is now conservative, the difference between
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the new and the old assets of the minimum wealth agent is taken from (if
positive) or given to (if negative) the neighbors of the poorest agent [11, 12].
The distribution obtained follows an exponential law as a function of the
square of the wealth and a poverty line with finite wealth is obtained by
self-organization, i.e. the poorer agents posses finite endowments (different
to what happens in most exchange models where the minimum wealth is
zero). The model was also studied in a kind of mean-field version where the
poorest agent interact with randomly chosen agents [17, 18] or by selecting
at random as partner of the agent with the minimal value of wealth one of
the neighbors of the first agent, and then both agents re-shuffle their entire
amount of wealth [27]. Finally, redistribution with the full society was also
considered [28]. The obtained Gini coefficient is relatively low and compares
well with the values of the Gini coefficient of some Northern European coun-
tries as Denmark or Sweden [12]. This suggests a path to decrease inequality
in real societies [12, 28]. A similar model was presented recently by Ghosh
et. al. [29] where particles below a given arbitrary threshold may interact
with other particles. They studied the system in mean-field, 1D and 2D and
found a distribution that deviates from the exponential Boltzmann-Gibbs
one. Also, a phase transition in the number of particles below the poverty
line is found as a function of the value of the threshold. This phase transition
is not present in the CEMM theory because here the threshold is a result of
the self-organization induced by the extremal dynamics.
Here we revisit this model considering a more realistic description of social
networks. We study the system on scale-free network (SF) and on random
Erdo¨s-Renyi (ER) network (for a review on these networks see, for example,
ref. [31]). The case of Watts-Strogatz small world networks has already been
partially discussed in ref. [18] and the results do not differ in a significative
way from the mean field results of ref . [11]. Besides, we do not try to describe
the power law region of the wealth distribution, as we are only considering
additive exchanges. The results will describe the middle and low income
agents, and also, we will obtain a poverty line that is a characteristic of
some countries, like Scandinavian ones where protective measures are taken
to help the less favored people. Anticipating on the results we are going
to show that the poverty line is a robust characteristic of the model, but a
strong correlation between the connectivity of the agents and their wealth
is also observed. Indeed, it seems that the more connected agents exhibit a
wealth less than average, because they have higher probability of interacting
with poorer agents.
4
In the next section we present a very short review of the original model:
the Conservative Exchange Market Model (CEMM) and its main conclusions.
Then, in section III we introduce the SF and ER networks and present the
main results for these networks. In section IV we discuss the results and
present the conclusions.
2. The Conservative Exchange Market Model - CEMM
The Conservative Exchange Market Model (CEMM) [11] is a simple
macroeconomic model that consists of a one-dimensional lattice with N sites
and periodic boundary conditions. Each site represents an economic agent
(individuals, industries or countries) linked to two neighbors. To each agent
it is assigned some wealth-parameter that represents its welfare, like, for ex-
ample, the GDP for countries or accumulated wealth for individuals. One
chooses an arbitrary initial configuration where the wealth is a number be-
tween 0 and 1 distributed randomly and uniformly among agents.
The dynamics of the system is supported on the idea that some measure
should be taken to modify the situation of the poorest agent. In this context,
this action is simulated by an extreme dynamics [26]: at each time step, the
poorest agent, i.e., the one with the minimum wealth, will perform (or be the
subject of) some action trying to improve its economic state. Then, at each
time step one chooses the agent with minimum wealth (the poorest agent)
and substitute it by a new agent (or by the same agent) with a new wealth
selected at random in the interval {0, 1}. Since the outcome of any such
measure is uncertain, the minimum suffers a random change in its wealth
that we call ∆w [11, 12]. As the selected site has the minimum wealth there
is a higher chance that it increases its wealth, i.e. that ∆w > 0. In the first
version of the model it was assumed that whatever wealth is gained (or lost)
by the poorest agent it will be at the expenses of its neighbors and that ∆w
will be equally deducted from (or credited to) its two nearest neighbors on
the lattice, making the total wealth constant. Numerical simulations on this
model showed that, after a transient, the system arrives at a self-organized
critical state with a stationary wealth distribution that is represented in
Fig. 1 [11]. It is possible to observe that almost all agents are above a
certain threshold or poverty line. This poverty line is self-generated[11, 27]
and not externally imposed [29] Another possibility is to subtract ∆w from
two agents picked at random. This situation has also been considered [17, 12],
it is the annealed or mean field version of the model, that corresponds to a
5
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
w
0
2
4
6
8
P(
w)
Figure 1: (color online) Plot of the wealth distribution for N = 10000 agents and aver-
aging over 1000 samples [11]. The sharp (black) line indicates the situation with nearest
neighbors interaction, while the wide (red) line corresponds to the mean field version of
the model.
situation in which the agents with which the exchange takes place are chosen
at random and not based on geographical proximity. The distribution is also
plotted in Fig. 1: it is almost flat and the poverty line is lower than in the
case of nearest neighbors interactions. In the nearest-neighbor version of
the model, one founds a minimum wealth or poverty line that is ηT ≈ 40%
of the maximum initial wealth and above this threshold the distribution
of the wealth of the agents is an exponential P (w) ≈ exp(−w2/2σ2), with
σ = 22.8 [17]. The obtained Gini coefficient, G [30], is very low, of the order
of G = 0.1. In the mean-field case the model exhibits a lower threshold,
ηT ≈ 20%, and, beyond it, also an exponential distribution with a higher
value of σ ≈ 56.7 [17] and of the Gini coefficient G ≈ 0.25.
One interesting characteristic of the dynamics of this model is that the
evolution of the system happens in avalanches. This is so because there is a
higher chance that the active site increases its wealth, then their neighbors
will more probably lose wealth and became the active site in the next time
step [12]. Examples of these avalanches can be seen in the original Bak-
Sneppen article [26] and also in ref. [11]. In both cases the distribution of
the size of the avalanches follows a power law with the same exponent.
In the present article we would like to discuss a similar model, but consid-
ering different networks. We are going to see that some topological effects on
the wealth distribution will be observed, particularly a correlation between
6
the wealth and the connectivity either of a given site or of its neighbor. In
the next section we present the results for SF and random ER networks.
3. CEMM on scale free and random networks
We performed simulations in complex ER and SF networks [31]. Random
ER networks are characterized by a Poisson degree distribution with P (k) =
e−〈k〉〈k〉k/k!, where k is the degree of a node and 〈k〉 is the average degree. In
SF networks the degree distribution is given by P (k) ∼ k−λ, for kmin ≤ k ≤
kmax, where kmin is the smallest degree, kmax is the degree cutoff and λ is the
exponent characterizing the broadness of the distribution: the smaller the
exponent of the SF network the higher is its degree of heterogeneity, because
as λ decreases the probability of nodes with high degree (hubs) increases.
To construct the SF networks we used the Molloy-Reed algorithm [32] (or
configurational model) with a “natural” cutoff for the highest degreeN1/(λ−1).
We assume that each node of the lattice is an economic agent, and its
initial wealth is a random number in the interval {0, 1}. Then we apply the
minimum dynamics and we wait a number of time steps long enough for the
system to arrive to a stationary state. The number of time steps depends on
the size of the network. Here we have simulated networks with N = 104 nodes
and the number of time steps to arrive to a stationary distribution is t = 106.
The obtained wealth distribution is similar to the original CEMM model, but
the poverty line and the inequality depends on the average connectivity of
the network 〈k〉.
On Fig. 2 we have represented the wealth distribution for three differ-
ent networks: two SF networks and one ER network. It is possible to see
that in all cases the poverty line is higher than in the mean field case but
lower than for the linear chain (both presented on Fig. 1). Considering the
degree distribution, the poverty line is lower for a SF network with smaller
exponent λ, corresponding to distributions with higher average connectivity.
For the random ER network the poverty line lies in between both plotted
SF networks. In the inset of Fig. 2 we represent P (w) as a function of w for
two SF and ER networks with the same average degree. We can see that the
curves strongly overlap, suggesting that the distribution mainly depends on
the average connectivity, 〈k〉. Furthermore, the values of the poverty lines
are very close to each other.
Also, in order to compare with the original model, we have represented
the wealth distribution in a semi-log plot against the square of the wealth. In
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Figure 2: (color online) Plot of the wealth distribution for two SF networks with λ = 2.5
(black circles, 〈k〉 = 5.2) and 3.5 (red squares, 〈k〉 = 2.9), compared with a random ER
network with 〈k〉 = 4 (green triangles). In the inset we plot P (w) as a function of w
for 〈k〉 = 5.2 for both SF and ER networks, in order to show that the poverty line is
practically the same for both networks.
the original model the number of agents with a given wealth was numerically
found to be a truncated exponential function of the square of the wealth. In
the present situation we can observe that the situation is different. On Fig. 3
one can verify that the exponential behavior seems to be valid only for low
values of the wealth, while there is a clear deviation from the linear behavior
and the distribution goes to zero faster than an exponential for high values of
the wealth. It is also clear that the slope of the distribution decreases when
the average connectivity increases.
Also, the inset in Fig. 2 suggest that the poverty line is mostly a function
of the average connectivity. In order of verify this point we represent on Fig. 4
the position of the poverty line for different SF and ER networks and the
results strongly indicate that the poverty line depends only on the average
connectivity. Also, the present values may be extrapolated to the case of the
linear chain, where the connectivity is k = 2: the obtained poverty line should
be near the value indicated on Fig.1, i.e. ∽ 0.4. However, it is not just the
poverty line that is essentially a function of the average connectivity, there
is also a visible effect in the inequality, that we measure through the Gini
coefficient. We have represented on Fig. 5 the Gini coefficient as a function
of the average connectivity, 〈k〉. One can observe that the Gini coefficient
decreases when increasing the exponent of the network, i.e. when decreasing
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Figure 3: (color online) Log-Linear Plot of the fraction of agents with a given wealth as a
function of the square of the wealth, for two SF networks with λ = 2.5, 〈k〉 = 5.2 (black
circles) and λ = 3.5, 〈k〉 = 2.9 (red squares), compared with a random ER network with
〈k〉 = 4 (green triangles).
the average connectivity. This is so because local interactions produce lower
inequality than global interactions [12]. This is in qualitative agreement
with the results of the original CEMM model where a Gini of only 0.08 was
obtained for the one dimensional ring with nearest neighbors interactions
(k = 2) [11]. Nevertheless, the Gini coefficient is slightly smaller for ER
networks compared with SF networks with the same average connectivity,
probably because the maximum degree of the ER network is lower than for
the SF network.
One also should expect that the degree of the agent should be relevant to
determine the chances of being affected by its neighbors. We discussed in the
previous section that the evolution of the system occurs through avalanches.
Then the neighbors of the active site have a higher probability of becoming
active in the following time step. If it is the case sites with more neighbors
(high degree) will have more chances of becoming active or, in other words,
to be the new poorer one. Then, it should be more convenient to have few
neighbors than to be highly connected.
We can verify this result by looking at figure 6 where we have represented
the number of times any site of connectivity k is the site with minimum wealth
as a function of its grade: The left panel seems to indicate the opposite of
what we are stating, as the number of times a site is the site of minimum
wealth is maximum for k = 1 and decreases following a power law with slope
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Figure 4: Plot of the position of the poverty line as a function of 〈k〉 for SF networks
(circles), where 〈k〉 ∼ (λ − 1)/(λ − 2), and ER networks (triangles). The bigger the
average connectivity the lower the poverty line. This is in agreement with the original
work, where a low connectivity results in a higher poverty line [11, 17]
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Figure 5: Plot of the Gini coefficient as a function of 〈k〉 for SF networks (circles), where
〈k〉 ∼ (λ−1)/(λ−2), and ER networks (triangles). A lower average connectivity diminish
the Gini coefficient generating a less unequal society. In any case the values of the Gini
coefficient are very low, and compare well with the case of the one-dimensional ring where
the obtained Gini coefficient was of the order of 0.08 [11]. We remark that the Gini
coefficients are equal for low values of the average degree and present a small difference for
higher values of the average connectivity (being the ER the more “egalitarian” network,
probably because its maximum degree is lower than for an SF network)
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Figure 6: (color online) Left panel: Plot of the number of times any site of connectivity
k is the site with minimum wealth (the poorest one) as a function of its degree. Right
panel: Plot of the frequency any site of degree k is the poorest one divided by the number
of sites of degree k and as a function of the degree. Black circles correspond to a network
with exponent λ = 2.5 and red squares to λ = 3.5. The dashed line in the right panel
indicates the slope 1. The right panel confirms that high degree nodes are the minimum
wealth ones with higher frequency
3/2 for λ = 2.5 and a slope a little bit higher for λ = 3.5 But we must be
aware that in a SF network the degree distribution is a power law, there
are much more nodes with low degree than with high degree. If we want to
determine the frequency that any node with a given degree is the poorest one,
we must divide the number of times any node with degree k is the minimum
by the number of nodes with degree k: N(k). This result is plotted in the
right panel of figure 6 and confirm our prediction. Moreover, the frequency
at which a node of degree k is the minimum increases linearly with k and
the slope is almost 1 independently of the exponent λ of the network.
As a verification of the previous result we have calculated the average
wealth as a function of the number of links an agent has (the global average
wealth is constant, as the system is conservative). We define de average
wealth of a node of degree k as the sum of the wealth of the nodes with
degree equal to k divided by the number of nodes with degree k, N(k) i.e.
w(k) =
∑
i∈Ωk
wi
N(k)
where i = 1, ...N and Ωk is the set of nodes with degree
k. We present in the left panel of figure 7 this average wealth as a function
of the degree: once again the results seems to be in contradiction with the
conclusion that it is more convenient to have low degree, as the figure shows
that low degree nodes have, in average, a wealth lower than the global average
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Figure 7: (color online) Left panel: Plot of the average wealth of a node of grade k,
w(k). Right panel: Plot of the average wealth of the neighbors of a node with degree k,
wnn(k) . Both panels represent a SF network with λ = 2.5 (black circles) λ = 3.5 (red
squares). Green triangles represent the ER network with 〈k〉 = 4 (it is not possible to
identify neighbors in the ER network, so there is no representation of the ER network in
the right panel). Remark that the neighbors of low connectivity nodes are in disgrace, as
their average wealth is lower than the global one: 0.5.
wealth. But one should keep in mind that the number of low degree nodes
is much bigger than the rest, so it is reasonable to think that they possess
a huge fraction of the total wealth but, in average, the wealth per capita is
somewhat smaller than the global average. On the other hand the average
wealth of the high degree nodes is slightly higher than the global average.
That means that high degree nodes are minimum with higher frequency but,
in average, they have a wealth higher than the global average. However it is
even better to be the neighbor of a high degree node. In the right panel of
figure 7 we plot the average wealth of the neighbors of a node with degree k,
defined as wnn(k) =
∑
i∈Ωk
∑
j∈Λi
wj
kN(k)
where Λi is the set of the k neighbors of
node i. In this last figure (right panel of Fig.7) it is clear that the neighbors
of low k nodes are less favored while neighbors of nodes with k ≥ 5 exhibit
an average wealth higher than the global average. The figures correspond to
networks with λ = 2.5 and λ = 3.5 but the results are qualitatively the same
for networks with different values of λ. Thus, the last sentence of the previous
paragraph should be modified by saying that in order to have a wealth higher
than the average one must have high degree and/or be the neighbor of one
high degree node.
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4. Conclusions
In the present article we have studied the Conservative Exchanges Market
Model (CEMM) on different types of complex networks. We have verified
that some characteristics of the models are robust, as for example the exis-
tence of a poverty line for finite wealth, and the fact that disorder on the lat-
tice increases the inequality (i.e. the Gini coefficient) and moves the poverty
line to lower values of income. On the other hand, deviations from the trun-
cated exponential dependence of the wealth distribution on the square of the
wealth, observed in the original model [11, 17] and in a small world net-
work [18] are much more evident in SF or ER networks, as it was shown on
Fig. 3.
The more interesting effects are related to the correlation of the wealth
with the connectivity of the agents. These correlations are very important
in SF networks. One expected result, verified by our calculations, is that in
a SF network, highly connected nodes, “hubs”, are richer than the average.
But this is true when making an instantaneous picture of the distribution
of wealth on the network (see Fig. 7). The analysis of the time evolution
indicates that the life of these richer “hubs” is not easy: they become the
minimum wealth agents with a frequency higher than low connected agents
(see Fig. 6). This is so because they have lots of lower degree neighbors
and, as one can verify looking to the right panel of Fig. 6, agents that are
neighbors of low degree nodes have a wealth lower than the average.
Thus, SF networks provide a good description of human societies. High
connected agents (people, companies, banks) are richer in average but sub-
jected to strong fluctuations, while low connected agents are poorer. In any
case this model provides a poverty line that guarantees a relatively low Gini
coefficient, thus the state of the poorer agents is not as catastrophic as in
other exchange models [10, 21]: within the CEMM’s there is no condensation
of wealth. A drawback of the model could be the fact that the networks are
static, a better representation of social economic exchanges should include
the possibility of changing partners, i.e. evolving social networks. Work in
this direction is in progress.
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